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There are two stylised facts, namely weak demand for life-annuities and flat age-wealth profile 
that contradict the life-cycle hypothesis. In this paper we design a theoretical framework, which 
combines plausible arguments, which have been put forward in the literature to reconcile theory 
with empirical evidence. Besides the existence of an annuity market and of a public pension 
system we assume risk-averse individuals who are uncertain about lifetime and disposable 
income and who have preferences for leaving bequests. It is shown that this framework can 
contribute to explain the observed portfolio decision in favour of financial assets relatively to 
annuities.  
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1. Introduction 
There are two empirical observations about the saving behaviour which recently have attracted 
much attention: First, demand for life annuities is weak. Second, age-wealth profiles show little if 
any tendency for elderly individuals to dissave in retirement. Both stylised facts contradict the 
life-cycle hypothesis, which state that the main reason for the individual saving behaviour is the 
desire to smooth consumption over one's lifetime appropriately.  
 
Flat age-wealth profiles are only compatible with the standard life-cycle model given risk-averse 
individuals, uncertain about their life-expectancy, if annuity markets do not exist (see e.g. 
Davies, 1981). In this case individuals would save in order to self-insure against the risk of 
longevity and would leave accidental bequests in case that their life span turns out to be 
unexpectedly short. However, with access to life-annuities, individuals should choose the latter, 
since they can offer a higher rate on return than riskless bonds (see Yaari, 1965). Thus, the 
puzzle is why do individuals purchase so few annuities to provide for old-age and instead save 
in financial assets.  
 
The incompatibility of the theory of consumption-savings behaviour with the empirical evidence 
is often subsumed under the catchword "retirement-savings-puzzle". It has been recognised as 
a major issue by the academics as well as by the politicians, since its resolution might have 
important implications for economic theory and for public policy, especially for the ongoing 
social security reforms which rely more strongly on private old-age provision. 
 
Various explanations for a portfolio decision in favour of financial assets relatively to life 
annuities have been put forward in the literature, in order to reconcile theory and empirical 
evidence: First it might not be the life-cycle motive, which induces individuals to save in financial 
assets, but to pass wealth on to relatives (the bequest motive) and to self-insure against other 
risks than longevity like illness and unemployment (the precautionary motive). Next, the lack of 
participation in the annuity market can be explained by the existence of a generous public 
pension system. In case that individuals receive (more than) enough social security benefits to 
provide for old-age consumption, they will not buy life-annuities. Finally, low annuity demand 
can be due to high annuity prices above the "fair" one. Empirical studies find that annuity prices 
are about 20 – 40 % above the actuarially fair price corresponding to the average survival 
probability of the population (see e.g. Walliser, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1999; Friedman and 
Warshawsky, 1990). Part of the so-called "load factor" is attributable to overhead costs due to 
administration, taxes and monopoly profit; the other part is due to adverse selection among 
annuity purchasers with differing survival probabilities. This depresses the expected rate of 
return on annuities and makes them less attractive compared to other form of wealth holding.    2
 
While most studies concentrate on one of these possible explanations (see e. Davies, 1981; 
Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990, Rodepeter and Winter, 1998), the aim of this paper is to 
design a theoretical framework, which combines all possible arguments, and to study to which 
extent the combination of these possible explanations can contribute to the observed portfolio 
decision in favour of financial assets relatively to life annuities. By this, this paper tries to clarify 
whether (or at least to which extent) the retirement-savings puzzle can be resolved. 
 
For this, we consider a two-period model which combines the existence of an annuity market 
and of a public pension system with risk-averse individuals who are uncertain about their life-
expectancy and who have preferences for leaving bequests to their relatives. The study of the 
portfolio behaviour in this framework is done in the first part of the paper. The results obtained 
from this analysis will serve then in the second part of the paper as a benchmark to study the 
consequences, when the framework is extended by adding uncertainty about disposable 
income.  
 
First, we consider solely longevity risk, but no income risk. Our main findings are that the 
empirical evidence of flat (or slightly increasing) age-wealth profiles in old-age which are mainly 
attributable to individuals at the upper end of the income distribution, while individuals at the 
lower end rather dissave, can be explained within this framework, when a positive influence of 
income on life-expectancy is supposed to exist. Further, we find that a generous public pension 
system combined with a high load factor of the annuity price and strong preferences of the 
individuals for leaving bequests can contribute to explain the observation of weak demand for 
life annuities.  
 
However, it is also plausible that individuals avoid consuming out of wealth or buying annuities 
for fear of the consequences of a negative shock on disposable income due to unemployment, 
catastrophic illness or other unforeseen circumstances. Thus, the second and more complex 
issue, addressed in this paper, concerns the effects of income (expenditure, resp.) uncertainty 
on the portfolio decision of the individual. We extend the model by introducing the risk of a 
negative shock on disposable income, where we consider three cases, which differ in the 
timing, when the negative income shock may occur and when the uncertainty is resolved. First, 
we consider uncertainty about retirement income, which is either resolved at the beginning of 
the retirement period or continues to prevail in old-age. Further, we consider income uncertainty 
until the end of the working period. We find that income uncertainties indeed can contribute to 
explain higher (precautionary) savings and lower consumption levels over lifetime, however only 
labour income uncertainty can explain the low annuity demand, observed in real world. 
   3
This paper is as organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the basic model under lifetime 
uncertainty, but without income risk, and study the portfolio decisions of an individual. In Section 
3 it is analysed how the introduction of three different cases of income risks affects the portfolio 
decision. Section 4 summarises and concludes the paper.  
 
2. Savings and annuity demand under lifetime uncertainty  
Consider an individual who lives for a maximum of two periods t = 0,1 and has an initial wealth 
M at the beginning of her life. In the working period 0, she earns a fixed labour income w. At the 
end of the working period 0 the individual retires. Survival to the retirement period 1 is uncertain 
and occurs with probability π,  1 0 < π < . Provision for future consumption is guaranteed by a 
social security system, organized according to the pay-as-you-go method. The individual pays a 
proportional social security tax rate τ on income and receives a benefit S(w), which depends on 
income.  
 
Preferences of the individual are represented by expected lifetime utility with a per-period utility 
function u depending on consumption ct, t = 0,1, and a per-period utility v derived from leaving a 
bequest B
i, i = sl, ll. That is 
 
) B ( v ) B ( v ) 1 ( ) c ( u ) c ( u U ll sl
1 0 π + π − + π + = , (2.1) 
 
where the superscript sl and ll represent short and long life, respectively. We assume that 




 and  0 v > ′ ,  0 v < ′ ′ .  
 
To smooth consumption over the uncertain lifetime appropriately, the individual can make 
private old-age provision in addition to the social security system. The annuity market offers the 
individual a payoff A in the retirement period 1 (conditional on the individual's survival), which 
she can purchase for a price Q per unit of the payoff A. If the individual had no bequest motive, 
she would decide for life annuities against holding wealth in the form of bonds, since the former 
can offer a higher rate of return than the latter, i.e. 1/Q > R (see Yaari, 1965). However, the 
annuity pays nothing to her heirs, when the individual dies young. Thus due to her preferences 
for leaving bequests, she chooses also riskless bonds E0, which guarantee a rate of return R in 
the next period, regardless of whether she survives or not. The budget constraint in each period 
t = 0, 1 reads 
 
0 0 E QA ) 1 ( w M c − − τ − + = . (2.2) 
ll
0 1 B RE A S c − + + = . (2.3)   4
 
At the beginning of the retirement period 1, lifetime uncertainty is resolved. If the individual does 




sl RE B = . (2.4) 
 
Otherwise she consumes c1 in the retirement period and leaves a bequest B
ll. By this, we make 
use of the standard assumption that the individual gives B
ll to her heir at the beginning of the 
retirement period (see e.g. Abel, 1986; Strawczynski, 1999). This allows us to define net 
savings E1 (in form of bonds) in the retirement period as the difference between B




1 EBB ≡− (2.4') 
 
Depending on whether this difference is positive, negative or zero, the individual has positive 
savings, dissaves or does not save at all in the retirement period. Further, we assume  0 A ≥ . 
By this, we rule out the possibility that the individual can sell annuities or raise a loan in the 
working period whose redemption is guaranteed through a life insurance. The individual decides 
on her consumption and bequest plan over the uncertain lifetime by maximizing (2.1) subject to 
(2.2), (2.3) and (2.4). Substituting (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) into (2.1) and differentiating with respect 
to A, E0 and B
ll, we obtain the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this maximization problem, 
 
A > 0  and   0 ) c ( ' u ) c ( ' Qu 1 0 = π + − , or  (2.5a) 
A = 0  and   0 ) c ( ' u ) c ( ' Qu 1 0 ≤ π + − , (2.5b) 
E0 > 0  and   ( ) 0 ) B ( ' v ) 1 ( ) c ( ' u R ) c ( ' u sl
1 0 = π − + π + − , or  (2.6a) 
E0 = 0  and   ( ) 0 ) B ( ' v ) 1 ( ) c ( ' u R ) c ( ' u sl
1 0 ≤ π − + π + − , (2.6b) 
B
ll > 0  and   ( ) 0 ) B ( ' v ) c ( ' u ll
1 = + − π or (2.7a) 
B
ll = 0  and   ( ) 0 ) B ( ' v ) c ( ' u ll
1 ≤ + − π . (2.7b) 
 
Note that the interior solution (2.5a), (2.6a) and (2.7a) will hold, as long as the social security 
benefits S are sufficiently small relatively to the survival probability π (compare 2.5a) and as 
long as preferences for leaving bequests are sufficiently strong relatively to the preferences for 
consumption (compare 2.6a and 2.7a). Otherwise a boundary solution will hold: In case that the 
individual is over-annuitized due to high social security benefits, annuity demand is equal to 
zero. In case that the individual has a sufficiently low bequest motive, savings E0 in the working 
period and/or bequests Bll will be zero. 
   5
Next, we study the portfolio decision of the individual i.e. how much of the initial wealth and of 
the net income M + w(1 − τ) is invested into annuities and financial assets in each of the two 
periods. It is shown that this decision depends on the relation between the rate of return R on 
riskless bonds and the expected rate of return on annuities
1, which is  Q π .
2 If this relation is 
equal to one, annuities are said to be individually fair. This gives us the corresponding 
individually fair annuity price  R Q ˆ π ≡ .  
 
Proposition 1: Consider that A > 0, E0 > 0, B
ll > 0 and the individually fair annuity price 
R Q ˆ π ≡ . If the annuity price is above (equal, below, resp.) the fair price, then an individual has 
negative (zero, positive, resp.) savings in financial assets in the retirement period. From this it 
follows that she consumes more than (exactly, less than, resp.) her retirement income, 
consisting of the social security benefits and the annuity payoffs, i.e. if Q <
> _
 Q ˆ , then E1 <
>
_
 0 and 
c1 <
> _
 A + S. 
 
Proof: Consider the interior solution (2.5a), (2.6a) and (2.7a). Substituting the equation in (2.5a) 
and (2.7a) into the equation in (2.6a) yields 
 
  ) B ( ' QRv ) 1 ( ) B ( ' v ) QR 1 ( sl ll π − = − π  (2.8) 
 
If Q = Q ˆ , (2.8) reduces to v'(B
ll) = v'(B
sl) and hence B
ll = B
sl. From this, together with (2.3) and 
(2.4) follows that c1 = A + S and thus, zero-savings in the retirement period, i.e. E1 = 0.  
 
By the same argument, one can show that an individual will dissave in old-age, if Q > Q ˆ . In this 
case, π(1 - QR) < (1 - π)QR, thus v'(B
ll) > v'(B
sl), so that E1 = B
ll - B
sl < 0 and c1 > A + S. If 
Q < Q ˆ , all of the results are reversed.   Q.E.D. 
 
In case that annuities offer the individually fair price Q ˆ , the individual buys bonds in the working 
period to leave bequests B
ll = B
sl and uses the social security benefits and the annuities to 
provide for consumption in the retirement. However, an individual will dissave in old-age, if 
Q > Q ˆ . In this case the expected rate of return on annuities is lower than the rate of return on 
bonds. Thus, it is an attractive strategy for the individual to provide for some of the consumption 
in the retirement period by financial assets. On the other hand, the individual has positive 
savings in the retirement, if confronted with an annuity price below her individually fair price Q ˆ . 
Hence, some of the retirement income, i.e. annuity payoffs and social security benefits, is not 
consumed but saved for bequests.  
                                                       
1  See also Abel (1986). 
2  Note that for each unit of expected annuity payoff π the individual pays a price Q.   6
 
Next, consider a situation, where the individual has a sufficiently low bequest motive, so that 
(2.6b) or (2.7b) holds (besides 2.5a). From the above considerations, we can conclude that 
Q > Q ˆ  is a necessary, but not sufficient condition that (2.6a) together with (2.7b) holds. In this 
case, due to the unattractively high annuity price (compared to that of bonds), the individual will 
save in the working period for consumption in the retirement period, but does not leave any 
bequests B
ll after having lived her maximum lifespan. This is an attractive strategy, since E0 can 
be used for two purposes, depending on whether or not she survives to the retirement period: 
old-age consumption and bequests B
sl. However she does not leave any bequests B
ll after 
having lived her maximum lifespan, since preferences for giving bequests are not strong 
enough. By the same reasoning, Q < Q ˆ  is a necessary, but not sufficient condition that (2.6b) 
together with (2.7a) holds. In this case, B
sl = 0 and B
ll > 0. Since the expected rate of return on 
annuities is higher than the rate of return on bonds, the individual does not save in the working 
period and thus does not leave a bequest B
sl, when she dies young. However she saves part of 
her annuity payoffs in the retirement period to leave a bequest B
sl. To conclude: Although the 
bequest motive is relatively low, individuals may save financial assets, since the rate of return 
on bonds diverge from the expected rate of return on annuities.  
 
Proceeding on the assumption that individuals differ in their life-expectancy and that there is 
asymmetric information in the private annuity, the individuals are confronted with a divergence 
of these two rates of return. Since annuity companies cannot distinguish individuals according 
to their life-expectancy, the first-best outcome, in which each individual receives her individually 
fair price according to her survival probability, cannot be realized. Instead the problem of 
adverse selection occurs. The fact that individuals with a long life-expectancy demand more 
annuities, leads to an over-representation of annuities bought by the high-risk individuals among 
aggregate annuity demand. As a consequence, insurance companies, in order to avoid losses, 
offer a price which is higher than the actuarially fair price based on the average survival 
probability of the population.
3 From this we can conclude that individuals with a survival 
probability below and somewhat above the average survival probability are confronted with an 
annuity price above the individually fair price Q ˆ  and thus reduce their financial assets in old-
age. On the other hand, individuals with a sufficiently high life-expectancy face a price below Q ˆ , 
and hence continue to accumulate financial assets even in the retirement period. 
                                                       
3  The adverse-selection problem in the annuity market was studied in various theoretical contributions, 
see e.g. see Abel, 1986; Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985), Townley and Boadway (1988) and 
Brunner and Pech (2002, 2005), Pech (2004). Empirical studies for the well developed US annuity 
market give evidence that prices are about 7  –  15  % above the fair price due to adverse selection 
(Walliser, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1999; Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990). Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) 
find that adverse selection exists to some similar extent in the voluntary annuity market of the United 
Kingdom.    7
 
In the next proposition we investigate the saving behaviour of an individual, in case that she is 
over-annuitized due to high social security benefits, thus annuity demand is equal to zero. 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that A = 0, E0 > 0, B
ll > 0. In this case, B
sl = B
ll at a price Q , which is 
above the individually fair price Q ˆ . Only if Q > Q , B
sl > B
ll and the individual dissaves in the 
retirement period. If Q < Q , then B
sl < B
ll and the individual has positive net savings E1 in the 
retirement period, i.e. if Q <
> _
 Q , then E1 <
>
_




Proof:  Consider (2.5b), (2.6a) und (2.7a). For an easy illustration of the result in this 
proposition, we rewrite the equation in (2.5b) and in (2.6a) as 
 
  ) c ( ' u
Q
) c ( ' u 1 0
π
>  (2.5b') 
  ) c ( ' Ru ) B ( ' Rv ) 1 ( ) c ( ' u 1
sl
0 π + π − =  (2.6a') 
 
and we multiply the LHS of the equation in (2.7a) with  R(1 - π)/π and rearrange it to  
 
  ) c ( ' Ru ) B ( ' Rv ) 1 ( ) c ( ' Ru 1
ll
1 π + π − = . (2.7a') 
 
First consider that Q = Q ˆ ,  R Q ˆ π ≡ : In this case (2.5b') reduces to  ) c ( ' Ru ) c ( ' u 1 0 > . From this 
it follows that the LHS of (2.6a') is greater than the LHS of (2.7a'). Consequently, the same 






From these considerations it follows that R must be higher than π/Q, such that the two LHS's of 
(2.6a') and (2.7a') are equal, i.e.  ) c ( ' Ru ) c ( ' u 1 0 = , as well as the inequality in (2.5b'), i.e. 
) c ( ' u ) Q ( ) c ( ' u 1 0 π > , holds. We define Q ,  Q  > π/R, as the price which fulfils these two 
conditions. Obviously, at  Q  v'(B
sl) = v'(B
ll). By the same argument as in proposition 1, it follows 
that v'(B
sl) < v'(B
ll), if Q > Q  and v'(B
sl) > v'(B
ll), if Q <  Q . Q.E.D 
 
Consider an individual who does not purchase annuities, although they are offered to her at her 
individually fair price Q ˆ , since she has (more than) enough retirement income in form of social 
security benefits. In this case, in order to leave bequests, the individual saves some of the 
labour income in the working period and saves some of the social security benefits in the 
retirement period. Thus, she leaves more bequests, when surviving to the retirement period. 
Only at a higher annuity price Q  she would decide to dissave in old-age and hence leave 
bequests B
ll < B
sl.    8
 
This theoretical result may help to explain why in countries with a generous public pension 
system, one observes positive saving rates even in the periods of retirement, although lower 
than in the working periods. This empirical evidence was found especially for Germany; see e.g. 
Börsch-Supan et al. (1999) and Schnabel (1999). Lately attention has been paid to this 
empirical observation, considered as a contraction to the life-cycle hypothesis. However, when 
there is a strong presumption of a bequest motive combined with the existence of a generous 
social security system, the empirical evidence of low annuity demand and flat age-wealth 
profiles can be regarded to be in accordance with theoretical results.  
 
Note, on the other hand, that the increasing wealth profile, which was found on the average, 
depends much on the income and wealth distribution of the population and can be mainly 
attributed to the upper end. At the lower end of the income distribution one observes a much 
flatter wealth accumulation during the working time and dissaving in the retirement time; see 
e.g. Schnabel (1999), Disney, Emmerson and Wakefield (2001). In the next proposition 3, we 
investigate the effect of income, initial wealth and of the survival probability on the portfolio 
behaviour. Empirical studies found evidence for a positive influence of income on life-
expectancy; see e.g. Attanasio and Hoynes (2000), Lillard and Panis (1998), Lillard and Waite 
(1995), Menchik (1993), hence the combined effects can be considered to be of special 
relevance. 
 
Proposition 3: Assume that A > 0, E0 > 0, B
ll > 0.  
(i)  An increase in the initial wealth M and in the income w has the following effects on the 
portfolio decision of an individual:  
- Savings  E0 in the working period as well as the bequests B
sl and B
ll increase by an 
increase in M. The same effect has an increase in income w, if social security benefits 
do not decrease with income, i.e. if  ≥ ∂ ∂ w S 0.  
- Net  savings  E1 in the retirement period do not change by an increase in M and w, if 
annuities are offered at the fair price Q ˆ . Otherwise, the effect of an increase of these 
variables on E1 depends on the third derivate of the utility function v(B
i) in the following 
way: Given that v''' ≥ 0, then E1 increases, if Q > Q ˆ , while E1 decreases, if Q < Q ˆ .
4 
Given that v''' < 0 the effect is ambiguous.  
-  An increase in M induces a higher annuity demand A, if savings E1 in the retirement 
period do not decrease (too much) by an increase in M. The same effect has an 
                                                       
4  The assumption of a positive third derivative denotes precautionary behaviour, as first explained by 
Leland (1968).   9
increase in income w, if social security benefits do not increase with income, i.e. if 
≤ ∂ ∂ w S 0. Otherwise the effect is ambiguous. 
(ii)  An increase in the survival probability π has the following effects on the portfolio decision of 
an individual: It induces a higher annuity demand A, lower savings E0 in the working period 
and higher net savings E1 and in the retirement period.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3 shows that individuals with higher initial wealth and income save more financial 
assets in the working period. Note that income has this effect only for certain, if social security 
benefits do not decrease with income, which is plausible probably for every existing social 
security system. But it is ambiguous whether higher income and higher initial wealth also means 
higher net savings E1 in the retirement period. On the other hand, we find that a higher survival 
probability induces less savings E0 in the working period, but higher net savings E1 in the 
retirement period. Hence, when a positive influence of income and wealth on life-expectancy is 
supposed to exist, it is plausible to expect positive old-age savings of rich and long-living 
individuals, while poor and short-living people probably dissave in old-age. Further, the 
combined effects suggest that the latter have also a lower annuity demand than the former. 
Note however that this conclusion is only correct for initial wealth, but for income only, if social 
security benefits do not change with income.
5 Again these theoretical findings point in the same 
direction as the empirical evidence, mentioned above, especially for countries with a generous 
public pension system combined with a high load factor of the annuity price: Aggregate annuity 
demand will be quite low and probably zero for individuals at the lower end of income and 




3. Savings and annuity demand under lifetime and income uncertainty 
In this section we extend the model of section 2 by introducing income uncertainty to analyse 
how the portfolio decision of an individual is affected, when savings in form of bonds also have 
the purpose to self-insure against an income risk, which might arise e.g. due to an 
unemployment or ill-health risk. This seems a relevant issue since income risk might induce 
                                                       
5 In many countries, regulations, which realise  0 w S = ∂ ∂ , at least below and above a certain threshold of 
income, are effective: On the one hand there are flat-rate pensions, which guarantee a minimum 
retirement income, on the other hand often an assessment ceiling for calculating benefits and 
contributions exists. 
6  In this case, annuity payments - in empirical studies usually treated as savings in the working period - 
and annuity payoffs - treated as dissaving in retirement - are only a small fraction in total savings.   10
people to avoid consuming out of wealth or buying annuities. However, note that the 
prerequisite for the existence of this precautionary motive of savings are incomplete insurance 
markets, which means that individuals cannot insure against all risks they are confronted with.  
 
In this section, we distinguish three cases, which differ in the timing, when the income risk is 
present and when it is resolved. In the first two cases we study the effects of uncertainty about 
old-age income. In case 1, it prevails until the individual dies, while in case 2 it is resolved 
already at the beginning of the retirement period. Note that in the first case, the risk of low 
income should be thought of as expenditures that due to unforeseen circumstances (such as 
large health expenditures) depress disposable income, which last until the end of life. On the 
other hand, the assumption of an old-age income risk that is resolved at the beginning of 
retirement seems more accurate, when considering individuals who learn about their health-
status or get informed about their retirement income at the end of their working period, e.g. 
when it is closely related to the final earnings in the working time. The case 3 considers 
uncertainty about the labour income that prevails until the end of the working period. This can 
be regarded as a relevant situation, when the assumption is made that an annuity contract is 
concluded during the working period, when the income risk still prevails. One could think of 
annuities for which the premium is paid yearly during the working period. Such annual-payment 
annuity contracts are quite common in Germany and Austria and are typically those for which 
individuals receive subsidies by the state.  
 
We introduce income (expenditure, resp.) risk into the model of section 2 in the simplest way: 
We assume an additive negative shock -ε. This allows us to specify W0 and W1 as 
 
 
, 1 y probabilit with
y probabilit with
) 1 ( w M







ε − τ − +
=  (3.0) 
 









=  (3.1) 
 
where  1 0 < β ≤  and  1 0 < γ ≤ . For the cases 1 and 2 with old-age income risk, we have 
0 > γ and  0 = β , while in case 3 with labour income risk,  0 = γ and  0 > β . All results refer to the 
interior solution of the maximization problem, thus boundary solutions, as in section 2, are 
neglected. 
 
Case 1: Old-age income uncertainty that prevails until the end of life ( 0 > γ and  0 = β ) 
Note that the individual is uncertain about her old-age income until the end of her life. Thus she 
will leave accidental bequests in case that the negative income shock is realized. Lifetime utility 
can be written as   11
 
)] B ( v [ E ) B ( v ) 1 ( ) c ( u ) c ( u U ll sl
1 0 π + π − + π + = , (3.2) 
 
where E is the expectation operator. Substituting (2.2) and (3.0) for β = 0 into (2.4) yields 
 
  ) c QA W ( R B 0 0
sl − − = . (3.3) 
 
By use of (3.0) for β = 0 and (3.1) for γ > 0, (2.3) can be rearranged to 
 
  1 1 0 0
ll c A W ) c QA W ( R B − + + − − = . (3.4) 
 
Substituting (3.3) and (3.4) into the lifetime utility function (3.2) and differentiating with respect to 
c0, c1 and A, respectively, yields the first-order conditions 
 
  ( ) )] B ( ' v [ E ) B ( ' v ) 1 ( R ) c ( ' u ll sl
0 π + π − = , (3.5) 
  )] B ( ' v [ E ) c ( ' u ll
1 = , (3.6) 
  )] B ( ' v [ E ) QR 1 ( ) B ( ' QRv ) 1 ( ll sl − π = π − . (3.7) 
 
Proposition 4: Old-age income uncertainty that prevails until the end of life (Case 1) has the 
following effect on the portfolio and consumption decision: Compared to a situation without the 
risk of a negative income shock in old-age, the individual consumes less in both periods of life. 
She demands more annuities, but buys less bonds in the working period and, hence, leaves 
less bequests B
sl in case that she does not survive to the retirement period. However, in case 
that the negative income shock is not realized, the individual will leave more ex-post bequests 
B
ll, after having lived for two periods. 
 
Proof: To show this result we take the interior solution without income uncertainty of section 2 
as a benchmark and compare it with the interior solution (3.5) – (3.7) with old-age income 
uncertainty. First compare (3.6) with the equation in (2.7a), which can be rewritten as,  
 
  ) B ( ' v ) c ( ' u ll
1 = . (2.7a*) 
 
Since  )] B ( ' v [ E ) B ( ' v ll ll < , the LHS in (3.6) is higher than the RHS in (2.7*). It follows that u'(c1) 
has to increase in order to restore equality between both sides in (3.6). Hence, c1 decreases, 
which implies that the RHS of (3.6),  )] B ( ' v [ E
ll , decreases (see (3.4)). This in turn implies that B
ll 
is higher, if the negative income shock does not occur. 
   12
Next, we substitute (3.7) into (3.5) to obtain  
 
  )] B ( ' v [ E
Q
) c ( ' u ll
0
π
= , (3.8) 
 
which we compare with  
 
  ) B ( ' v
Q
) c ( ' u ll
0
π
= , (3.9) 
 
which is obtained by substituting the equation in (2.7a) into the equation in (2.5a). By the same 
arguments as before, the LHS of (3.8) is higher than the LHS of (3.9). Thus, c0 has to decrease 
(due to income uncertainty), since this increases the LHS of (3.8), u'(c0), and decreases RHS of 
(3.9),  )] B ( ' v [ E
ll . 
 
Finally, we eliminate  )] B ( ' v [ E
ll  by use of (3.7) into (3.5), which gives 
 
  ) B ( ' v
QR 1
) 1 ( R




= . (3.10) 
 
Since u'(c0) has increased, v'(B
sl) has to increase too, to restore the equality on both sides of 
(3.10). From this follows that B
sl and thus E0 have to decrease. However, it turns out by use of 
budget equation (3.3) that this is only possible, if annuity demand increases. To be precisely the 
increase in the annuity expenditures +Q∆A has to be higher than the decrease in -∆c0. Q.E.D. 
 
The intuition for this result is as follows: Since annuities offer a higher rate of return than riskless 
bonds, annuities provide a better protection than savings against a negative income shock, 
which can occur only in the retirement period. 
 
Case 2: Old-age income uncertainty that is resolved at the beginning of the retirement period 
( 0 > γ and  0 = β ) 
Uncertainty about old-age income (expenditures, resp.) resolved at the beginning of the 
retirement is plausible, when it is assumed that individuals have the opportunity to get informed 
about their retirement income or to learn about their health-status. In this case the individual is 
confronted with a two-stage decision problem. In the working period 0, she chooses the 
following variables: Annuity demand A and her consumption level c0 in the working period, and 
thus bequests B
sl and her total uncertain "retirement-wealth"  A W ) c QA W ( R D 1 0 0 + + − − ≡ . 
For this decision she takes into account her optimal level of consumption c1 and of bequests B
ll, 
which she will choose in the retirement period 1 after the resolution of both risks, i.e. knowing   13
about her retirement income and whether she has survived. Formally, this two-stage problem 
can be written as: 
 
  t = 0:  )] A W ) c QA W ( R ( [ E ) B ( v ) 1 ( ) c ( u max 1 0 0
sl
0 A , c0
+ + − − ϕ π + π − + , (3.11) 
   s.t.  (3.2) 
  t = 1:  ) B ( v ) c ( u max ll
1 c1
+  (3.12) 
   s.t.  (3.3) 
  
 where  } c D B ) B ( v ) c ( u { max ) D ( 1
ll ll
1 c1
− = + ≡ ϕ . 
 
By inserting (3.3) into (3.11) and differentiating with respect to c0 and A as well as inserting (3.4) 











π + π − = ]
D
) D (
[ E ) B ( ' v ) 1 ( R ) c ( ' u sl




[ E ) QR 1 ( ) B ( ' QRv ) 1 ( sl
∂
ϕ ∂
− π = π − , (3.14) 
  ) B ( ' v ) c ( ' u ll
1 = , (3.15) 
 
where by application of the Envelope Theorem 
 
  ) B ( ' v
D





Proposition 5: Old-age income uncertainty that is resolved at the beginning of the retirement 
period (Case 2) has the following effects on the portfolio and consumption decision: Compared 
to a situation without an income risk, the individual consumes less in the working period, 
demands more annuities and less bonds in the working period (and hence leaves less bequests 
B
sl in case of death). If she survives to the retirement period, she allocates the – now certain - 
retirement-wealth W1 on consumption c1 and bequests B
ll. In case that the negative income 
shock does not occur, the individual has a higher consumption level c1 and leaves more 
bequests B
ll, after having lived for two periods. 
 
Proof: We consider the interior solution without income uncertainty of section 2 and compare it 
with the interior solution (3.13) – (3.15) with old-age income uncertainty. Inserting (3.16) and 
(3.14) into (3.13) yields (3.8); eliminating  ] D ) D ( [ E ∂ ϕ ∂  by use of (3.13) and (3.14) gives (3.10). 
As shown in the proof of the foregoing Proposition 4, consumption c0, bequests B
sl and savings   14
E0 must be lower and annuity demand A must be higher compared to a situation without the risk 
of a negative income shock. 
 
After the lifetime and income uncertainty has been resolved, the allocation of the realized 
"retirement-wealth" D (either with or without the negative income shock) on consumption c1 and 
bequests B
ll is made according to (3.15). We know that E[v'(B
ll)] decreases (to restore equality 
on both sides of (3.8)). From this together with the comparison with (2.7a'), i.e. the F.O.C. 
without income uncertainty, it follows that B
ll and c1 are higher, if the negative income shock 
does not occur.  Q.E.D. 
 
Thus comparing Case 1 and Case 2, which differ only in the timing of the resolution of the old-
age income uncertainty shows the following difference: In case 2, where the individual gets 
informed about her old-age income (or health-care expenditures) at the beginning of the 
retirement period, she splits it up on consumption and bequests. In case 1, however, where the 
individual fears old-age income risk (or the risk of the consequences of catastrophic illness) 
during the whole time of retirement, she has more precautionary savings in the retirement 
period, which leads to accidental bequests, in case that no negative income shock has 
occurred.  
 
Case 3: Labour income uncertainty that prevails until the end of the working period ( 0 = γ and 
0 > β ) 
Finally, we investigate the consequences of labour income uncertainty, e.g. due to the risk of 
unemployment in the framework employed throughout this paper. By this, the analysis is kept 
simple and comparable, but needs as a prerequisite that the annuity contract is concluded 
during the working period, when the income risk still prevails, such as a annuity for which the 
premium is paid yearly.  
 
In this case again, the individual has a two-stage decision problem: In the working period 0, she 
chooses annuity demand A and her consumption level c0 in the working period, and thus 
bequests B
sl and her total uncertain retirement-wealth D. For this decision she takes into 
account her optimal level of consumption c1 and of bequests B
ll, which she will choose in the 
retirement period 1 after the resolution of both lifetime and labour income risk. Note that the 
difference to case 2, discussed above, is that the individual is uncertain about her income in the 
working period as well as about her retirement-wealth D at time t = 0. Thus, labour income risk 
produces accidental bequests B
sl, besides B
ll . Formally, this two-stage problem can be written 
as: 
   15
  t = 0:  )] A W ) c QA W ( R ( [ E )] B ( v [ E ) 1 ( ) c ( u max 1 0 0
sl
0 A , c0
+ + − − ϕ π + π − + , (3.17) 
   s.t.  (3.2) 
  t = 1:  ) B ( v ) c ( u max ll
1 c1
+  (3.18) 
   s.t.  (3.3) 
    
where  } c D B ) B ( v ) c ( u { max ) D ( 1
ll ll
1 c1
− = + ≡ ϕ . 
 
By inserting (3.3) into (3.17) and differentiating with respect to c0 and A as well as inserting (3.4) 











π + π − = ]
D
) D (
[ E )] B ( ' v [ E ) 1 ( R ) c ( ' u sl




[ E ) QR 1 ( )] B ( ' v [ QRE ) 1 ( sl
∂
ϕ ∂
− π = π − , (3.20) 
  ) B ( ' v ) c ( ' u ll
1 = , (3.21) 
 
where by application of the Envelope Theorem 
 
  ) B ( ' v
D





Proposition 6: Labour income uncertainty that prevails until the end of the working period 
(Case 3) has the following effect on the portfolio and consumption decision: Compared to a 
situation without an income risk, the individual consumes less in the working period, demands 
less annuities and more bonds in the working period. Hence, she leaves more bequests B
sl in 
case of an early death, given that the negative income shock has not occurred. If she survives 
to the retirement period, she allocates the – now certain - retirement-wealth D on consumption 
and bequests. In case that no negative income shock has occurred, she leaves more bequests 
B
ll as well as has a higher consumption level c1. 
 
Proof: We consider the interior solution without income uncertainty of section 2 and compare it 
with the interior solution (3.19) – (3.21) with labour income uncertainty. Inserting (3.22) and 
(3.20) into (3.19) yields again (3.8). As shown in the proof of the Proposition 4, consumption c0 
in the working period must be lower and E[v'(B
ll)] has to decrease. This in turn implies that 
)] B ( ' v [ E sl  has to decrease too, which is straightforward to see by use of (3.20) and (3.22). From 
this it follows that in case that the negative income shock in the working period does not occur, 
the individual will leave higher bequests B
sl in case of non-survival to the retirement period,   16
compared to a situation without any income risk. Hence, the individual will have higher savings 
E0 in the working period. 
 
After lifetime and income uncertainty has been resolved, the allocation of the retirement-wealth 
D (either with or without the negative income shock) on consumption c1 and bequests B
ll is 
made according to (3.21), which is equal to (3.15). Thus, as shown in the proof of proposition 5, 
B
ll and c1 are higher, if the negative income shock has not been realized.  Q.E.D. 
 
Thus, a comparison of the labour income uncertainty to old-age income uncertainty allows the 
following conclusions: Both labour and old-age income risk induces the individual to reduce 
consumption in the working period. However, the first risk increases savings E0 in the working 
period, while the latter risk increases annuity demand. The intuition for this result is obvious: 
Only savings of financial assets are an appropriate strategy to self-insure against negative 
income shock in the working period. In case of uncertainty about income in the retirement 
period, both, savings and annuities can serve as a protection against a negative shock; 
however since annuities offer a higher rate of return, this strategy is more attractive. 
 
4. Conclusions 
There are two stylised facts, namely weak demand for life annuities and flat age-wealth profile 
in old-age, that contradict the life-cycle hypothesis. Many plausible arguments have been put 
forward in the literature to reconcile theory with empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to 
design a theoretical framework, which combines these arguments, to study to which extent 
these can contribute to explain the observed portfolio decision in favour of financial assets 
relatively to annuities. To do so, we consider a two-period model which combines the existence 
of an annuity market and of a public pension system with risk-averse individuals who are 
uncertain about lifetime and disposable income and who have preferences for leaving bequests.  
 
We found the following results given that there is a longevity risk, but no income risk: Individuals 
with higher wealth and income save more financial assets in the working period, but it is 
ambiguous whether this means also higher financial assets in the retirement period. However, 
when a positive influence of income and wealth on life-expectancy is supposed to exist, one can 
expect higher positive savings of rich (and long-living) individuals in old-age, while poor (and 
short-living) people probably dissave. These theoretical findings are in accordance with the 
empirical evidence, which show that the flat (or slightly increasing) age-wealth profiles in old-
age, observed on the average, are mainly attributable to individuals at the upper end of the 
income distribution, while individuals at the lower end rather dissave. On the other hand, we   17
found that annuities are not an attractive strategy to provide for old-age in countries with a 
generous public pension system combined with a high load factor of the annuity price. In this 
case, aggregate annuity demand is quite low and probably zero for individuals at the lower end 
of income distribution.  
 
Further, we have extended the model by introducing a negative income shock on disposable 
lifetime income, where we have distinguished between three cases, which differ in the timing, 
when and how long the income uncertainty prevails. We compare the results with those under 
income certainty: In case that there exists the risk of a negative shock on the disposable income 
in old-age, annuity demand increases and savings in riskless bonds as well as consumption in 
the working period decreases. If the individual gets informed about the level of her old-age 
income (or health-care expenditures) at the beginning of the retirement period, she splits it up 
between consumption and bequests. On the other hand, when the individual is uncertain about 
her disposable old-age income during the whole time of retirement, she saves more in the 
retirement period for precautionary motives, which leads to lower consumption and accidental 
bequests. In contrast, the risk of a negative shock on the labour income induces a lower annuity 
demand and precautionary savings in the working period and hence accidental bequests, if she 
dies young. When surviving to retirement, she splits up her whole retirement wealth, which she 
knows for certain at that time, on consumption and bequests. From these results we can 
conclude that income uncertainties can contribute to explain higher savings for precautionary 
motives and lower consumption levels over lifetime, however only labour-income uncertainty 
can explain the weakness of annuity demand. 
 
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3 
We determine the effect of a marginal change of a parameter X = M, w, π on E0, B
ll, E1 and A. 
For this we make use that the LHS of the equation in (2.5a), (2.6a) and (2.7a), resp., is the first 
derivate of the lifetime utility function (2.1) with respect to A, E0 and B
ll, resp.  
 
Implicit differentiation of the interior solution (2.5a), (2.6a) and (2.7a) with respect to a 























































































































































0  (A1) 
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where the first matrix of the LHS of (A1) is the (symmetric) Hessian Matrix. Its elements are 
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where  H 1 − ≡ θ  with  H  as the determinant of the Hessian Matrix, which is negative due to the 
second-order conditions of the maximisation problem. Thus,  0 > θ .  
 
Finally, remember that E1 = B






















   19
(i)   First, we determine  X E0 ∂ ∂  for X = M, w, π. Substituting (A2), (A4) – (A7) together with  
 





























  into (A9) for X = M yields 
 









  which is positive (remember that  0 > θ , 1/Q > R and strict concavity of u(ct) and v(B
i)). We 











































  and (A2), (A4) – (A7) into (A9) to obtain 
 
   ) B ( v ) c ( u ) c ( u )
w
S




2 0 ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ π
∂
∂





  It follows that  0 w E0 > ∂ ∂ , if  0 w S ≥ ∂ ∂ . To determine  π ∂ ∂ 0 E , we calculate  
 

















∂ , (A21) 










  According to the first-order-condition (2.7a)  ) B ( ' v ) c ( ' u
ll
1 = , thus  
 










  Inserting (A2), (A4) – (A7) and (A20) – (A22) into (A9) for X = π gives  
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   () [
() ] ) c ( u ) B ( v ) c ( u ) c ( u ) QR 1 ( Q
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  which is negative.  
 
(ii)  Next, we determine  X B
ll ∂ ∂  for X = M, w, π. We calculate (A10) for X = M by substituting 
(A2) – (A3), (A5) – (A7) and (A12) – (A14) into (A10) to obtain   
 











  which is positive. In the same manner, we determine  w B
ll ∂ ∂  by use of (A2) – (A3), (A5) – 
(A7), (A10) and (A16) – (A18), i.e. 
 
   ) B ( v ) c ( u ) c ( u )
w
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∂
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  (A25) is positive, if  0 w S ≥ ∂ ∂ . Finally, substituting (A2) – (A3), (A5) – (A7) and (A16) – 
(A18) into (A10) for X = π yields 
 















  which is positive.  
 
(iii) Next, we determine  X E1 ∂ ∂  for X = M, w, π. Substituting (A15) and (A24) into (A11) for 
X = M gives 
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) 1 ( QR
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2 1 . (A27) 
 
  Note that the sign of the RHS of (A27) is determined by the last term in the brackets on the 
RHS of (A27). Observe that if Q <
> _
  Q ˆ , 
R
Q ˆ π
≡ , then 
) 1 ( QR










proposition 1). Obviously,  ) B ( v ) B ( v
ll sl ′ ′ ′ ′ = 1, if B
sl = B
ll
. From these considerations follows 
that  0 M E1 = ∂ ∂ , if Q = Q ˆ .  
 
 However  for  B
sl > < B
ll, we have to make assumptions about the third derivative  ) B ( v
i ′ ′ ′  to 
assess the size of  ) B ( v ) B ( v
ll sl ′ ′ ′ ′ : (a) Given that  0 ) B ( v
i = ′ ′ ′ , then  1 ) B ( v ) B ( v
ll sl = ′ ′ ′ ′ . (b) 
Given that  0 ) B ( v
i > ′ ′ ′ ,  ) B ( v ) B ( v
ll sl ′ ′ ′ ′ > < 1. (c) Given that  0 ) B ( v
i < ′ ′ ′ ,  ) B ( v ) B ( v
ll sl ′ ′ ′ ′ > < 1.   21
These considerations allows us to conclude: if Q > < Q ˆ , then  −
π −
π −
) 1 ( QR
) QR 1 (
) B ( v





> < 0 and 
thus,  M E1 ∂ ∂ > < 0, given that  0 ) B ( v
i ≥ ′ ′ ′ . However, given that  0 ) B ( v
i < ′ ′ ′ , the effect is 
ambiguous.  
 
 We  determine  w E1 ∂ ∂  by use of (A11), (A19) and (A25), i.e. 
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2 1 . (A28) 
 
  Obviously, for (A28) the same considerations apply like for (A27), in case that  0 w S ≥ ∂ ∂ : If 
Q = Q ˆ ,  0 w E1 = ∂ ∂  (irrespective of the slope of  ) B ( v
i ′ ′ ). If Q > < Q ˆ , then  w E1 ∂ ∂ > < 0, given 
that  0 ) B ( v
i ≥ ′ ′ ′ . However, given that  0 ) B ( v
i < ′ ′ ′ , the effect is ambiguous. 
 
  Finally, we show that  0 E1 > π ∂ ∂ . This follows immediately from the fact that  0 B
ll > π ∂ ∂  
and  0 E0 < π ∂ ∂  (see (A11), (A23) and (A26)). 
 
(iv) Finally we determine  X A ∂ ∂  for X = M, w, π. For X = M, we substitute (A3) – (A7) and 
(A12) – (A14) into (A8). This gives 
 










π − ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ π − π θ + ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ π θ − =
∂
∂
) B ( v
) B ( v
) 1 ( QR
) QR 1 (















) B ( v ) B ( v ) c ( u QR
M
A 1 ll sl
1 ∂
∂





  From (A29) it is straightforward to see that  0 M A > ∂ ∂ , if  0 M E1 ≥ ∂ ∂ . Otherwise the effect 
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  Note that the first term on the RHS of (A30) is positive (zero, negative, resp.), if (A28), i.e. 
w E1 ∂ ∂ , is positive (zero, negative, resp.). By use of this result, inspection of (A30) shows: 
If  0 w S ≤ ∂ ∂  and  0 M E1 ≥ ∂ ∂ , then  0 w A > ∂ ∂ . Otherwise, effect is ambiguous. Obviously,   22
the effect can reverse, i.e.  w A ∂ ∂  may be non-positive, in case that  0 w S > ∂ ∂  and 
0 M E1 < ∂ ∂ .  
 
  Substituting (A3) – (A7) and (A20) – (A22) into (A8) for X = π yields  
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which is positive.   Q.E.D. 
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